Membership Required: Juventude Brasileira and Fascist Education in Brazil’s Estado Novo Dictatorship by Daniels, Anne M.
  
Instructions for authors, subscriptions and further details:  
http://hse.hipatiapress.com 
 
Membership Required: Juventude Brasileira and Fascist 
Education in Brazil’s Estado Novo Dictatorship 
 
Anne M. Daniels1  
 
1) Wilmington College (United States) 
 
Date of publication: February 23th, 2020 
Edition period: February 2020-June 2020 
 
 
To cite this article: Daniels, A. M. (2020). Membership required: Juventude 
brasileira and fascist education in Brazil’s Estado Novo dictatorship. Social 
and Education History, 9(1), 65-87. doi: 10.17583/hse.2020.4220 
 
To link this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.17583/hse.2020.4220 
 
 
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE  
 
The terms and conditions of use are related to the Open Journal System and 
to Creative Commons Attribution License (CCAL). 
 
HSE – Social and Education History Vol. 9 No.1 February 2020 pp. 
65-87 
 
 
 
2020 Hipatia Press 
ISSN: 2014-3567 
DOI: 10.1783/hse.2020.4220 
Membership Required: 
Juventude Brasileira and 
Fascist Education in Brazil’s 
Estado Novo Dictatorship 
 
Anne M. Daniels 
Wilmington College (United States) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Brazil’s Estado Novo dictatorship (1938-1945) saw the establishment of a new 
national youth organization called Juventude Brasileira (Brazilian Youth). Founded 
by Hitler Youth-inspired bureaucrats, the organization’s operations show how 
profoundly fascism pervaded the inner-workings of this regime, and more generally, 
how much educational policy reflects the most foundational priorities of an 
authoritarian government. However, the persistent dissent against Juventude 
Brasileira, from within the Ministry of Education and ultimately by a dissatisfied 
public clamoring for democracy, also illustrates paths of resistance against 
authoritarianism. 
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Resumen 
 
La dictadura de Estado Novo en Brasil supuso la aparición de una nueva organización 
juvenil llamada Juventude Brasileira (Juventud Brasileña). Fundada por burócratas 
inspirados en las Juventudes Hitlerianas, las operaciones de la organización muestran 
hasta qué punto el fascismo impregnó el funcionamiento interno de este régimen y, 
de forma más general, cuánto reflejan las políticas educativas las prioridades más 
fundamentales de un gobierno autoritario. En cualquier caso, la disidencia permanente 
contra Juventude Brasileira, desde dentro del Ministerio de Educación y, finalmente, 
por parte de un insatisfecho clamor público en favor de la democracia, también 
muestran vías de resistencia contra el autoritarismo.  
 
Palabras clave: historia de la educación [Brasil], Estado Novo [Brasil], Getulio 
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n the 1920s, Brazil was engulfed in a generational crisis. The rigidly 
oligarchic political and economic power structure of the so-called “Old 
Republic” faced challenges from diverse sectors of Brazilian society, and 
in 1930 the broad-based “Liberal Alliance” led by lawyer and opposition 
politician Getúlio Vargas rose to power with widespread popular support. But 
by the mid-1930s ideological and political opposition to Vargas’s regime, 
especially from partisans hoping for more radical change, contributed to a 
tumultuous “state of siege” that bred paranoia and violence throughout Brazil 
(Hilton, 1975, p. 168). The wide range of violent uprisings of these years—
including communist, liberal, and fascist rebellions—ultimately allowed 
Vargas to consolidate his power in a new authoritarian political formation: the 
Estado Novo, or “New State” regime.  
Both Vargas and his political rivals sought influence over youth as a way 
of influencing the future shape of society. Both sides used the rhetoric of 
protecting the young as a weapon in their political struggle and both pursued 
the formation of youth cadres to politicize young people. After the 
establishment of the Estado Novo, however, it was Vargas who was most able 
to enforce his vision of youth’s proper role in society. A new national youth 
organization called Juventude Brasileira (Brazilian Youth, JB), established 
shortly after the founding of the Estado Novo, became an important 
instrument of control in Vargas’s regime.  
The Estado Novo has long been understood by historians, both in North 
America and Brazil, as having been purely personalistic and “without any 
consistent ideological basis” (Skidmore, 1967, p. 32). “The regime of ‘His 
Majesty, the President,’”—an old saying that still has currency in Brazil— 
underscores the almost monarchical conception of sovereignty that has 
sometimes held sway in the country, with power invested in the body of the 
chief executive rather than any party or popular movement (de Scatimburgo, 
1982, p. 49).¹ However, more recent scholarship that deeply explores the 
regime’s bureaucratic archives has tended to support the notion that there were 
clear ideological foundations to Vargas’s dictatorship, built upon home-grown 
nationalist corporatism and directly inspired by European fascism. Brazilian 
historian of education Ademir Valdir dos Santos (2012) strongly defends the 
characterization of the Estado Novo as fascist. Like other fascist governments 
of its time, the regime used the language of “patriotic exaltation”, 
“revolutionary nationalism”, and the need for “societal renewal after a period 
I 
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of purported decadence” (pp. 138, 146). Simultaneously, the regime radically 
expanded its oversight at every level of public life, attempting to eradicate all 
dissent while actively increasing lawmaking and law-enforcing abilities (Bica 
& Corsetti, 2012, pp. 253-79).  
The history of Juventude Brasileira places a frequently neglected historical 
pattern into sharp relief: education and youth policy are foundational to the 
formation of authoritarian nationalist regimes. As Peter Van Der Veer (1998) 
writes, “It is especially in the history of education that one may find the history 
of modernity illuminated” (p. 290). JB’s intended purposes were similar to 
those of youth organizations in other fascist countries at the time.² Certainly 
the most infamous of these, the Hitlerjungend of Nazi Germany, was but one 
in a cohort that also included Italy’s Opera Nazionale Balilla (later the 
Gioventú Italiana del Littorio) and fascist Portugal’s Mocidade Portuguesa 
among others. Regardless of origins, all of these authoritarian youth 
organizations saw education as central to their missions and their missions as 
central to the goals of the regime as a whole. In the process of Nazification, 
Fascicization—or Estadonovicization—education was, as Alessio Ponzo 
(2015) has written, “as essential as coercive repression, necessary to change 
the habits and character of their peoples and to create disciplined societies 
united by a uniform national political culture” (p. 4). The history of education 
during the Estado Novo, from curriculum development in the halls of the 
Ministry of Education to student essays and playground games, provides 
surprisingly wide-ranging evidence of the powerfully ideological nationalist 
character of the regime.  
In this article, I first provide an overview of the ideological divisions that 
characterized 1930s Brazil, especially focusing on how these competing 
movements understood youth and sought to involve young people in their 
struggle for supremacy in the country. I then turn to the rise of the Estado 
Novo dictatorship. Youth and education were immediately taken up as 
priorities for the regime, and the creation of Juventude Brasileira became its 
hallmark policy. Using primary sources to explore JB’s creation, operation, 
and eventual dissolution, I show that this youth organization’s history 
provides a particularly clear view of the fascistic character of the Estado Novo 
regime. The “Christian Corporatism” that motivated its creators was directly 
inspired by and formed a cohesive whole with Fascist movements elsewhere 
in the world during that era. 
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While Juventude Brasileira exemplifies the role of youth policy in the 
formation of fascist regimes, it also reveals key insights into the patterns and 
practices of resistance to fascism. While the Estado Novo operated on the 
youth as a tool to leverage their power, a close examination of Juventude 
Brasileira’s rise and fall also shows the limitations of forcibly imposing 
fascistic education in a racially, culturally, and ideologically diverse society 
like early-twentieth-century Brazil. Throughout the organization’s short life, 
teachers, parents, and policymakers all voiced skeptical and moderating 
voices that weakened the regime’s ability to indoctrinate and militarize 
children, and ultimately undermined fascism’s hold over the country as a 
whole. 
The Rationale of the Estado Novo 
In 1934, the broad-based revolution that had brought Getúlio Vargas to power 
passed a reformist Constitution and shortly thereafter Vargas was elected to a 
four-year term as President. Though violence was required to install Vargas 
in 1930, and to put down secessionist revolts like the Paulista War of 1932, 
by 1934 a stable and even partially democratic government seemed poised to 
move forward with its social and economic reforms. These were, as Daryle 
Williams (2001) writes, “critical years,” when the new constitution held out 
the promise of extending enfranchisement, protecting civil liberties and 
employment protections, and bringing a liberal, inclusive democracy to Brazil 
for the first time (p. 60). However, by the time of scheduled elections in 1938, 
Brazil had just faced four politically tumultuous years marked by partisan 
revolts and finally the imposition of a nationalist and authoritarian 
dictatorship. 
Throughout much of the 1930s, Vargas saw Communism as the gravest 
threat to his regime. Founded with Comintern support in 1922, the Brazilian 
Communist Party (PCB) had seduced many former anarchists from the 
industrial working class (significantly comprised of Iberian and Italian 
immigrants) and gained support in the countryside while adherents 
campaigned against the Old Republic in the late-1920s. By the mid-1930s the 
party saw itself in a position to challenge the Vargas presidency. In 1935, 
Communist rebels rose up in the cities of Natal, Recife, and Rio de Janeiro, 
and quickly found in their swift defeat that they were not in a position to 
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challenge the regime. To use Shawn C. Smallman’s (2002) succinct turn-of-
phrase, “The rebels never had a chance” (p. 51). The resulting crackdown led 
to mass imprisonments of Communists and a pervading sense of paranoia in 
the government. 
Though the PCB was hardly a serious threat to the military and police 
power of the Brazilian state, neither before nor after the 1935 uprising, 
Vargas’s fears of communist infiltration and plotting were not unfounded. 
Since the 1920s, Brazilian communists had propagandized heavily those 
sectors of society they deemed most supportive and/or in need of their 
revolution, including the young. In the 1930s, communist intrigue riddled 
even the tamest stronghold of middle-class Brazilian society: the normal 
school. In 1932, some boys from the Red Federation of Students (Federação 
Vermelha de Estudantes) passed out bulletins written “especially for 
normalistas” to the girls at Rio’s Institute of Education one day after classes. 
When the bulletins showed up littered around classrooms and school 
bathrooms, the Institute’s director, Lourenço Filho, reported the incident to 
the police (“Instituto da Educação Documents”, ca. 1932-1936.). 
A 1936 incident at the same normal school shows just how much the stakes 
of Brazil’s ‘red scare’ had increased after the 1935 Communist uprising. The 
school librarian, Dona Margarida, revealed to Lourenço Filho that she had 
uncovered an assassination plot against Getúlio Vargas tangentially involving 
one or more Institute teachers. At Lourenço Filho’s request, the police took 
depositions from various teachers. The next week, an Institute of Education 
teacher was interviewed by O Povo newspaper accusing Lourenço Filho 
himself of being a communist, a Bolshevik, and, correspondingly, of hiring 
the sort of teachers who would want to do a thing like assassinate Vargas. 
What more evidence do you need, the paper asked, than the presence of books 
about the Soviet Union in the school library? Lourenço Filho’s letter of 
explanation to the President, clearly penned immediately upon his first 
reading of the O Povo article, is panicked. His normally curved and elegant 
handwriting is replaced by a scrawl as he explained his actions over the past 
week, defended his innocence, and decried communism. Lourenço Filho, a 
friend of Education Minister Gustavo Capanema and of Vargas himself, 
retained his position unscathed (“Instituto da Educação Documents”, ca. 
1932-1936.). 
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In the mid-1930s, a much more powerful and realistic threat to the Vargas 
government came from the same ideological sphere that had brought the 
regime to power.  Liberalism, as both a domestic and international force, both 
tangibly and ideologically menaced the regime. The National Liberal Alliance 
(ANL), founded in 1935, was one of the most numerically and politically 
significant oppositional forces during Vargas’s presidency. According to 
Brian P. Owensby (1999), as many as four hundred thousand members joined 
the organization within just four months of its founding (p. 141). While the 
ANL did maintain a limited political alliance with the PCB, their agenda was 
ultimately electoral (Smallman, 2002, pp. 51, 206).  The Rio de Janeiro youth-
directed magazine of the ANL, Juventude, described itself as “a democratic 
magazine […] that will fight for the immediate interests of youth”, including 
better working conditions in factories and fields, fewer working hour to 
improve health, free medical and dental care for students and workers, 
primary schools that distribute food and clothing, lower fees for secondary 
schools, and freedom of thought, and “against the anti-democratic, military, 
and dictatorial clowns” (“Apresentação”, 1935). Their calls for more fully-
realized electoral democracy and a greater challenge to industrial oligarchies 
quickly won the ANL the ire of Vargas’s national security forces and the 
organization was summarily outlawed just a few months after its founding. 
After 1935, with the apparent destruction of Communism and Liberalism 
as tools for protesting the inadequacies of Vargas’s regime, the far right rose 
to fill the vacuum of dissent. The Brazilian Integralist Action (AIB, or 
Integralistas), was a fascist political party strongly influenced by both 
Portuguese and Italian fascism (Bertonha, 2011, pp. 65-87). Founded in 1932, 
the “Green Shirts” spent much of the mid-1930s clashing with Communists 
and Liberals in the streets of Brazil (Hilton, 1975, pp. 169-170). The party 
was particularly attractive to teenaged boys and young men of European 
descent, and after 1935, their numbers expanded and even Vargas began to 
adopt their symbols and slogans, including using their motto “Fatherland, 
family, and religion” in major speeches (Hilton, 1975, pp. 168-69). In 1937, 
as the country prepared for the upcoming presidential election, armed 
conflicts between Integralists and disenfranchised left-wing dissenters 
terrorized many Brazilian cities (Hilton, 1975, pp. 169-170). 
In this struggle of ideologies, many key government and military leaders 
attributed the violence and political chaos of the mid-1930s to “aliens,” 
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“internationalism,” and “foreign ideologies” (Smallman, 2002, p. 55). Such 
rhetoric coincided with a sense that Europe (the source of these alien 
philosophies) was past its time and even on the verge of collapse. In 1934, 
Carlos Martins, later ambassador to Washington, wrote to Foreign Minister 
Afrânio de Melo Franco, warning of Europe’s “collective insanity” and of the 
“imminent change or end of European civilization” (as quoted in Hilton, 1975, 
pp. 5-6). It seems that even children may have sensed this preoccupation with 
Europe’s coming demise. In 1936, as the Second Italo-Ethiopian War raged 
on the other side of the planet, a teacher from Rio’s Escola Estados Unidos 
sketched notes on an overheard conversation between a group of her twelve- 
and thirteen-year-old students: “Italy won, but she’s gonna go at it with 
England. Then England will fight with Germany, Germany with France, 
France with Spain, Spain with Portugal, and Europe will end.” According to 
the teacher, one student even framed his contribution to the conversation as 
evidence of the superiority of Brazilian “racial democracy”³ over European 
nationalist imperialism, saying, “The ‘Selaisie’ says that as long as there’s 
even one black man left in Abyssinia, he’ll keep fighting. But as long as there 
are blacks, Italy will keep fighting. She doesn’t like blacks” (as quoted by 
Ramos, ca. 1937).  
As war loomed in Europe and European ideologies destabilized Brazil, 
Vargas “conspicuously” endorsed no candidate for the 1938 election 
(Skidmore, 1967, p. 24). Having made his plans and appointed a friendly 
Minister of War in (later president) Eurico Dutra, Vargas released reports of 
a supposed Communist plot of mass assassinations of elected officials. On 
November 10, 1937, with both the military and the Integralist party behind 
him, Vargas declared the Estado Novo (Skidmore, 1967, pp. 24-29). 
Policies and Instruments of Control of the Estado Novo 
A children’s book about the life of Getúlio Vargas, later disseminated to every 
schoolchild in Brazil, described the advent of the Estado Novo like this:  
 
On the 10th of November, 1937, the congressmen arriving at the 
capitol found the doors closed: nevermore will you hear there those 
stupid and useless chats and 200 mil-reis a day for each of them. The 
people filled the streets with joy. The sky filled with stars. On that 
night, a night filled with light and happiness, the President arrived at 
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the radio microphone and announced the birth of the Estado Novo 
and the death of the Most Excellent and Illustrious Madame 
Politics… And on that day even the worms complained that her 
rotting corpse was poisonous (Tia Olga, 1939, pp 71-72). 
 
Vargas’s radio broadcast and release of a new Constitution on the evening 
of November 10, 1937, spelled out many of the new policies of the Estado 
Novo. Vargas abrogated the 1934 Constitution, dissolved congress, gave 
himself a six-year term and the power to rule by decree, and suspended interest 
payments on foreign debt. “The constitutional organization of 1934, poured 
in the classic molds of liberalism and a representative system, revealed 
lamentable faults,” he argued in a speech that night, and “[was] outdated in 
relation to the spirit of the time […] and intended for a reality that had ceased 
to exist” (as quoted in Hilton, 1975, p. 171). 
Though the initial response in Brazil was either quiet or quieted, the rest 
of the world was either shocked or intrigued by Vargas’s move. Newsweek 
claimed “Vargas Makes Brazil First American Fascist State” (1937 November 
22). The next week, Newsweek followed on with the headline: “Fellow 
Dictators Now Dream of Imitating Vargas” (1937 November 29). The 
German Ambassador to Brazil wrote blithely: “As for the effect of the turn of 
events on Brazil’s relations with Germany, it can neither economically nor 
politically be an unfavorable one, since the president, who is friendly towards 
us, remains in power” (as quoted in Hilton, 1975, p. 173). Though in the 
coming months Germany and Brazil did draw closer together economically, 
Stanley Hilton (1975) argues that Vargas worried about his new regime’s 
close links with fascist governments and the Integralist party in Brazil.  The 
first few months of the Estado Novo, though proclaimed throughout the world 
as a fascist dictatorship, were largely concerned with limiting the influence 
and power of the Integralists, perhaps to demonstrate that this change in 
government was a purely “Brazilian phenomenon” (Hilton, 1975, p. 174). The 
AIB was outlawed and then decimated after instigating a putsch in early 1938. 
Despite this rejection of Integralism, the consolidation of the Estado Novo 
reflected in many ways the transformations that fascist states in Europe were 
making. The new Constitution of 1937 was largely based on Poland’s April 
Constitution, and in some Brazilian circles was even disparagingly dubbed a 
Polaca (the Polish one), also a nickname for European prostitutes (Levine, 
1998, p. 51). Besides deconstructing all forms of electoral politics, the 
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Constitution and early decrees implemented new mechanisms of authoritarian 
control. The national police, which had had anti-insurgent authority since 
1935, became a full-fledged secret police under Vargas’s direct control for 
silently stamping out dissent. The Department of Propaganda underwent a 
partial merger with the “Special Police” to become the Department of Printing 
and Propaganda (DIP) that oversaw censorship of all books, periodicals, and 
plays, as well as speeches and correspondence by government officials. By 
late 1938, sixty percent of all newspaper and magazine articles were actually 
written by the DIP (Levine, 1998, p. 60). 
How would this new regime and its authoritarian apparatuses affect 
young people? Vargas had made the improvement of living conditions for 
children an important part of his regime’s policies and rhetoric since the 
early 1930s, and young people featured prominently in the new 
estadonovista Constitution. Article 127 reads “Children and youth should be 
the objects of care and special guarantees on the part of the State, which will 
take all the means necessary to assure them the physical and moral 
conditions for a safe and healthy life and the harmonious 
development”.“Moral conditions” and “harmonious development”, two 
ideas which belie the conservative and corporatist ideology of the new 
regime, would guide the government’s interactions with Juventude 
Brasileira. 
 
Juventude Brasileira 
 
The earliest seeds for the formation of a national youth organization were 
planted in early 1938 by Francisco Campos, Minister of Justice and one of the 
most powerful far-rightists in the Estado Novo. In memos disseminated to the 
President’s office and the Ministries of War and Education he proposed the 
creation of a Youth Army, specifically referencing the youth groups in 
Germany, Italy, and Portugal, with military ranks and ruled by military 
discipline. Using the highly nationalistic language that had already become 
typical, both publicly and privately, in the Brazilian government, Campos 
wrote that he envisioned youth “oriented in a single direction […] and 
disciplined in the elevated principles of patriotism, which is the appointed 
service that the Estado Novo gives to the Patria and, above all, to the Future 
of Brazil” (Campos, ca. 1938). 
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Campos believed that a centralized and disciplined youth organization 
along the lines of the Hitler Youth could help inculcate the regime’s goal of 
national devotion in young people, especially those from the urban working 
class, which as late as the 1930’s was described as “essentially foreign” 
(Gambini, 1977, pp. 58-59). A British visitor to Brazil in 1940 wrote, 
“Germany, like Japan, considers her immigrants in South America as 
‘minorities’, fellow countrymen that can conveniently acquire foreign 
citizenship but that should retain their ties of cultural and political utility to 
the Fatherland. (…) In fact, the German consular corps and commercial agents 
have already begun to infiltrate the Brazilian colonies with their programs and 
propaganda of ‘racial solidarity’” (as quoted in Gambini, 1977, p. 61). Though 
in 1938 Brazil maintained friendly relations with the countries that had 
contributed most of its immigrants—Italy, Portugal, Spain, Germany, and 
Japan—Campos hoped a youth army could effectively indoctrinate the next 
generation to see themselves as Brazilians first. 
In response to Campos’s call to arms, synopses of different extant youth 
organizations were quickly disseminated to the relevant Ministers, including 
descriptions of the structure, funding schemes, and activities of Germany’s 
Hitlerjugend, Italy’s Opera Nazionale Balilla, and Portugal’s Mocidade 
Portuguesa. One industrious bureaucrat even researched parallel 
organizations in the United States before concluding that “the tradition of 
North American liberalism does not permit a national organization connected 
to the state”, and so youth leagues were private, like the YMCA (Capanema, 
1938 September 19). 
Minister of War and key co-conspirator in the establishment of the regime, 
General Eurico Gaspar Dutra, recommended caution when trying to emulate 
these foreign fascist organizations. “[T]he organization of Brazilian youth 
[must] be made in accordance with our realities, good or bad, and never under 
the models that don’t adjust to our environment… Listen, Brazil is essentially 
different from those nations.” First, he argued, Brazil was defined by social 
and geographic heterogeneity and disparity: 
 
The conditions of life in Milan are more or less similar to those in 
Turin. And the poorest town in Germany still has a school, a sports 
field, and a police station… Brazil has cities that are bigger than 
Belgium, and where life works quite differently than in a typical 
Portuguese village. 
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Second, illiteracy, not lack of military discipline, was the most important 
hindrance to the nation. Third, he noted, Brazil, unlike these European models, 
was safely situated in South America, and so was not “under perpetual threat 
of war.” (Dutra, ca. 1938). 
This criticism prompted discussion on the role of militarism in the 
proposed “Youth Army.” The Ministry of War was itself divided on the issue. 
Dutra questioned the necessity of military leadership after calculations 
revealed that the proposed format would require about one fifth of all 
sergeants in the Brazilian military to serve as cell leaders. The Director of the 
Military Library believed that a militarist model was necessary, but perhaps 
could be done more in the style of Scouting, though “All international 
institutions, including Scouting, present the danger of infiltration by 
propagandistic elements with exotic ideas or of the influences of organizations 
like ‘Intelligence Service’, ‘Gestapo’, ‘Komintern’, ‘Secret Service’, ‘Service 
d’Informations’, etc.” Of most importance, he argued, was that boys be 
instructed and disciplined by men. 
 
With the type of instruction that’s practiced in Brazil, we will risk, 
as we’ve already seen examples of, creating a generation of weak 
and useless rapazes (young men), effeminated by the Freudian 
influence that they feel during their entire period of development. 
 
He blamed the lack of male students at Brazil’s overwhelmingly female 
normal schools for this deficiency (Xavier, 1940 May 21). Ideally, a 
regimented and militarized organization could overcome the hypotrophied 
masculinity of Brazil’s rising generation of men. 
The Ministry of Education, under Gustavo Capanema, expressed deep 
concerns about structuring the organization as a “youth army” at all. An 
unsigned letter from the ministry argued that excessive military presence 
would create distrust, especially among the partisans that the regime had 
dedicated the mid-1930s to destroying. “If it assumes a paramilitary character 
or a fascist coloration, Integralism and communism will rise again.” However, 
did that mean that it would be better to wait and see how the coming war ends 
before deciding how to organize Brazilian youth?  
 
HSE – Social and Education History, 9(1) 77 
 
 
No! No matter the economic and military outcome of the war, liberal 
democracy has already lost politically and socially. Its fundamentals 
are irredeemably condemned… Christian corporatism that smashes 
Jewish financiers and international monopolies will float above the 
waters of the coming flood (“Notas reservadas”, ca. 1939).  
 
What form, then, would a “Christian corporatist” youth organization take? 
From Campos’s proposal of a youth army in early 1938 until March 1940, 
the Ministries of War and Education were overtaken by incessant bureaucratic 
squabbling on this issue, with only occasional input from the President’s 
Office. The Ministry of War hashed out a proposed decree by mid-1938, for 
“The National Organization of Youth”, voluntary for all children ages 8 to 17, 
self-funded, directed under the National Division of Eugenics and Medical 
Assistance, and featuring frequent anthropometric assessments, rural labor 
rotations, and a great deal of pre-military training. Minister of Education 
Gustavo Capanema responded to the proposal, “Millions of 8 to 18 years olds 
do not an army make!” He urged the elimination of work rotations, medical 
assistance, and military education for a focus on moral and civic instruction, 
under the direction of the Ministry of Education, beginning at age seven (when 
children started school), and obligatory for all students lest it become partisan. 
In conclusion, he noted, “If you think it’ll pay for itself through member 
donations, you’re crazy” (Capanema, 1938 September 19). The President’s 
contribution to the process included exhortations to wrap the whole thing up, 
and occasional gibes at Capanema. While hashing out some final details in 
late 1939, including which historical figure would be the patron of the 
organization, Vargas joked about Capanema’s choice of the eighteenth- 
century revolutionary Tiradentes as the group’s symbolic patron, who like 
Capanema was from the state of Minas Gerais: “Tiradentes was basically 
impotent and hardly an exemplary hero!” (Vargas, ca. 1939). 
Finally on March 8, 1940, Decree-Law No. 2,072 established Juventude 
Brasileira, ‘Brazilian Youth’. Its structure closely cleaved to Capanema’s 
proposal made a year before, though its patron was the Duque de Caxias, a 
nineteenth-century war hero who, like Vargas, was from Rio Grande do Sul 
state. Upon publication of the decree, individuals and organizations that had 
been tangentially related to the process of its creation warmly congratulated 
Capanema, who had ultimately made himself the brains behind the JB and the 
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man on top of the organization chart. The director of the Museu Paulista 
praised the JB for encouraging:  
 
The security and enhancement of the Fatherland, love of military 
duty, discipline, attachment to the home, perseverance in work, 
perfection of physical education and respect for hygiene, reverence 
for the flag and national anthem, vehement interest in intellectual 
and cultural development,” in short, all the nationalist and 
corporatist values that the regime espoused (de Tauney, 
1940 May 20).   
 
The Boy Scouts of Brazil, founded in 1924, immediately offered to 
integrate with Juventude Brasileira, and a decree quickly took them up 
on the offer, effectively dissolving the Scouts as an independent 
organization (União de Escoteiros Brasileiros, 1940 March; Decreto-
Lei 2.310, 1940). 
Though 211,000 young people took part in inaugural parades 
throughout Brazil in the spring of 1940, it took years more for the 
Ministry of Education to resolve what JB would actually do. Questions 
of uniforms, badges, flags, and funding consumed uncountable man-
hours of bureaucratic work. Between 1940 and 1943, 17 decrees issued 
by Vargas dealt with Juventude Brasileira. Months of debates preceded 
a 1940 contest in which students would write an epic poem about JB, 
with the winning entry to be enshrined as the organization’s “official 
poem.”  Ironically, in the end all of the entries were deemed 
unacceptable. The Ministry promulgated a long-list of holidays to be 
celebrated in JB cells—33 in total. October 23rd was Day of the Aviator, 
September 21st Tree Day, April 7th Abdication of Emperor Pedro I Day, 
November 27th Day of the Communist Uprising of 1935 and its 
Victims. Most important, April 19th, Getúlio Vargas’s birthday, was the 
Day of Youth (“Documentation of the Juventude Brasileira”, ca. 1943). 
The slough of holidays each had an accompanying historical, national, 
or ethical lesson, but also seemed designed to make work —to keep 
them busy, both the bureaucrats and the children. 
Eventually JB came to have two primary activities: extra classes at 
school led by specially screened teachers that inculcated moral and 
civic duties, and mass rallies in support of Getúlio Vargas and the 
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Estado Novo. Capanema, considering what lessons were most important 
for Brazilian youth of the 1940s to learn, opined: 
 
The Brazilian moço (young person) is a severe judge of his ancestors, 
because unfortunately he does not believe in his race and admires all 
things foreign … The young generations were educated in the 
illusion of Brazil being a latent paradise that hasn’t already bettered 
itself solely through the negligence of its inhabitants (Ministry of 
Education, 1941 June).  
 
The work of JB, then, would be to instill nationalism and respect for a 
corporatist social order, where each individual had an appointed and respected 
(if necessarily limited) role in society with corresponding duties and 
obligations. Both of these values could be promoted, the regime believed, 
through stimulating a cult to Vargas. 
In the lesson plan disseminated for the May 1st Workers’ Day holiday, all 
of these elements featured prominently. On April 30th students of every age at 
every school in Brazil would be taught, first, that Workers’ Day is not just a 
day off school, but “a day of spirit and fervor, a day of national confraternity”; 
second, that through learning to work “the young can prove that ultimately all 
professions in a Christian and democratic society are equally noble”; and 
third, that workers’ rights had already been guaranteed by President Getúlio 
Vargas, including the eight hour work day, holidays, minimum wage, 
pensions, workplace safety, and unions (Ministry of Education, 1943). 
Because Capanema had successfully lobbied for JB membership to be 
mandatory for all students, this message’s range was huge. Perhaps as little as 
25% of the approximately 8 million Brazilian children in this age bracket were 
enrolled in school in 1940, but that still means 1 out of every 20 Brazilians 
studied this exact lesson on April 30, 1943 (Plank, 1996). 
The mass rallies of Juventude Brasileira were events on an enormous scale 
and tended to have explicit pro-Estado Novo messages, the easier to hear and 
understand in a crowd of thousands, the better. At one Rio de Janeiro rally, a 
teenaged JB member was chosen to deliver a speech written by the 
Department of Printing and Propaganda on the role of the Brazilian girl and 
woman in society. In this speech the socially conservative gender values of 
corporatism were made uncommonly explicit, perhaps because it was written 
for a young audience, 
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The Brazilian woman must fight, fight hard, not to become equal to 
man in his daily work, but fight to make healthy homes that men will 
protect… If the husband can’t make enough to support a couple, the 
wife can certainly go to work, but only if it’s strictly necessary. And 
she should still do the work of running the house, where she’s 
irreplaceable. A single girl can more easily work and should 
(Menezes, 1941 August 19). 
 
These rallies, though made up of youth, also preached powerful messages 
to adults regarding the extent of Vargas’s power and authority in the country. 
A 1942 rally speech by Capanema hinted at the apparent effectiveness of 
Vargas’s domination of young Brazilians, saying, 
 
There was once a time when education was considered preparation 
for life, a preparation for the future. You were for the future. Not 
today! Today, with the support of President Getúlio Vargas, you 
already are. That is to say, you already exist, as a present reality, 
with a present value, as an essential force of the present (Capanema, 
1942 April 18). 
 
He concluded, “Getúlio Vargas is hope. Getúlio Vargas is the greatest 
hope. Before him your attitude must be, Brazilian youth, nothing less than 
undying loyalty” (Capanema, 1942 April 18). 
But by 1942, the role and rhetoric of JB was already being questioned. 
After years of diplomatic negotiations, and finally under strong pressure from 
the United States, Brazil entered World War II on the side of the Allies. 
Vargas and the Ministry of Education no longer wanted JB to so closely 
resemble Europe’s fascist youth armies. As a show of friendship with the U.S., 
JB added a new holiday and lesson plan to celebrate the bicentenary of the 
birth of Thomas Jefferson in April 1943, but 1943 was almost wholly given 
over to squabbling about how the JB might subtly restructure while still 
maintaining is nationalist, pro-Vargas color (Ministry of Education, 1943 
April 13). The daily functioning of the organization changed little. 
By 1945, the Estado Novo was under fire. The contradictions of Brazilian 
troops fighting and dying in Italy to defend democracy, while being unable to 
vote in their own country (Garcia, 1982, pp. 17-18), had slowly contributed to 
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a storm of dissent. Though Vargas had promised an election at the end of the 
war, distrust of the regime exploded in early 1945. In March of that year, most 
leading newspapers concerted to stop submitting articles to the DIP for 
censorship. One of the very first issues they addressed after refusing 
censorship was Juventude Brasileira. A series of articles in Rio de Janeiro’s 
leading newspapers lambasted the organization and its leadership. Minister of 
Education Capanema was framed as the nefarious mastermind behind a dark 
plan to brainwash the children of Brazil. 
 
The Minister who walked around after the Revolution of 1930 
wearing a black shirt, wanted to give his own timid contribution to 
the undisguised fascism that’s been instituted in this country since 
1937. He adopted a plan similar to Giuventu Fascista [sic], the 
administration of which he considered his totalitarian duty 
(“Giuventu”, 1945). 
 
He was particularly criticized for having invented the stipulation that JB 
membership be mandatory, which at the time he had argued would prevent it 
from being partisan. Correio da Manhã interpreted it as another element of 
the brainwashing:  
 
It was the obligatory presence of all students of all ages that gave the 
impression that he was trying to instill in those developing minds the 
principle of respect to the dictatorial regime and to the men that 
needed to take advantage of this regime in order to perpetuate their 
own power (“Giuventu”, 1945). 
 
However, the papers also argued that Capanema’s scheme had been an 
utter failure. “If there was a fascist plan that never took hold in this country, 
despite the interests of the Estado Novo dictatorship, it was this ‘Juventude 
Brasileira’ styled after the ‘Hitler Youth.’” Indeed, claimed O Jornal, the JB 
had never truly existed because Brazilian youth “always manifested an 
instinctive revulsion for this organization, inspired and designed after the Nazi 
model,” and any time they had marched in parades and “waved the flags” they 
had been forced to by the DIP (“Sem Junção”, 1945). 
Juventude Brasileira truly had been designed to indoctrinate youth with 
loyalty to the regime and its “Christian corporatist” values. It was invented as 
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a mechanism of control, to enhance the power and legitimize the authority of 
the Estado Novo. But in 1945, Juventude Brasileira became one of the most 
powerful arguments against the regime. In a very youthful country like mid-
century Brazil, almost every single member of urban, middle-class society 
would have been affected by the requirements of JB, as their child, grandchild, 
niece or nephew was obliged to buy uniforms, recite anthems, and attend 
parades celebrating Vargas’s power. As the legitimacy and physical 
domination of the Estado Novo was increasingly challenged, JB became a 
singularly repulsive aspect of the dying regime, one that had the reach and 
rhetorical power to unite millions against the regime. 
The organization fell apart quite quickly in late 1945. In August the Rio de 
Janeiro school directors’ union wrote Capanema about an upcoming 
scheduled JB rally. They promised they would try to make the students march, 
but vacillated: 
 
It is feared that any attitude of insistence assumed by the directors of 
the schools could provoke disfavorable public relations and 
unforeseen consequences. Feeling, on one hand, responsibility to 
prevent this, and on the other, not wanting to cease collaborating for 
the glory of civic celebrations, and in face of the outbreak of flu that, 
even though it is getting better, is not yet wiped out, we directors 
decided to consult with you, Minister, on what we should now do 
concerning the convenience of whether or not the parade should 
happen (Lund, 1945 August 17).  
 
The parade did not take place. In October, the regime fell and JB 
bureaucrats stopped receiving paychecks. Juventude Brasileira simply faded 
away. 
The history of Juventude Brasileira offers valuable insights into the nature 
of Brazilian society in the late 1930s and early 1940s and, more broadly, into 
the role of education in authoritarian consolidations. Juventude Brasileira was 
an attempt by the state to forcefully manipulate youth into conforming to the 
regime’s ideal of how the Brazilian of the future should behave and believe.  
The primary sources that underpin this article are largely the creations of 
education administrators, high-level government bureaucrats and ministers, 
and journalists—those whom Teun van Dijk (1993; 2009; 2011) calls 
“symbolic elites”, who through their privileged access to public discourse 
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have outsized influence in the reproduction of racism and other systems of 
domination. However, van Dijk (1993) argues, this influence can also be used 
to dismantle those systems of domination (pp. 19-20). In the back-and-forth 
of bureaucrats and educators struggling for power and influence in the Estado 
Novo authoritarian regime, discord can be seen. Their disunity perhaps 
created an opening for the subjects of their discourse, popular elements like 
students, youth organizers, and concerned families, to resist the imposition of 
fascistic ideology. The ultimate failure of this project, and its vanishing from 
the public memory of the Brazilian people despite mass participation at the 
time, provides an optimistic lesson from history for those who would oppose 
authoritarianism in education and beyond.  
Notes  
1 This usage originates with British Brazilianist Ernest Hambloch’s 1936 history of Brazil His 
Majesty The President of Brazil: A Study of Constitutional Brazil (New York: EP Dutton, 
1936), which argued that Vargas fit into the typically Latin American caudillo model which 
Hambloch contends had prevailed in Brazil since the end of the Empire.  
 
2 The only recent historical work on Juventude Brasileira, Aline de Almeida Hoche’s 
“Juventude Brasileira: mobilização juvenil no Estado Novo (1940-1945),” Revista Acesso Livre 
2, no. 2 (2014): 125-142, emphasizes that the organization’s founding reflected international 
trends in the 1930s. In Britt Haas, Fighting Authoritarianism: American Youth Activism in the 
1930s (New York: Empire State Editions, 2018), Haas explains that this trend extended even 
to liberal democracies, for example with the formation of youth divisions of political parties 
(like the Young Republicans) at this time. 
 
3 Popularized by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre in his 1933 bestseller Casa-Grande & 
Senzala [Masters and Slaves], the concept of “racial democracy” contended that Brazil could 
lay claim to a racial and social superiority over monoethnic societies by virtue of being racially 
diverse and blended. The idea was adopted and celebrated by the Vargas regime and remains 
influential even today in Brazil. 
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